Evolutionary Game Theory

Evolutionary Game Theory
Author :
Publisher : MIT Press
Total Pages : 292
Release :
ISBN-10 : 0262731215
ISBN-13 : 9780262731218
Rating : 4/5 (15 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Evolutionary Game Theory by : Jörgen W. Weibull

Download or read book Evolutionary Game Theory written by Jörgen W. Weibull and published by MIT Press. This book was released on 1997 with total page 292 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. This text introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.


Evolutionary Game Theory Related Books

Evolutionary Game Theory
Language: en
Pages: 292
Authors: Jörgen W. Weibull
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 1997 - Publisher: MIT Press

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Introduces current evolutionary game theory--where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet--emphasizing the links between static and dy
Fundamentals of Evolutionary Game Theory and its Applications
Language: en
Pages: 223
Authors: Jun Tanimoto
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2015-10-23 - Publisher: Springer

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

​This book both summarizes the basic theory of evolutionary games and explains their developing applications, giving special attention to the 2-player, 2-stra
Evolution and the Theory of Games
Language: en
Pages: 244
Authors: John Maynard Smith
Categories: Science
Type: BOOK - Published: 1982-10-21 - Publisher: Cambridge University Press

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

This 1982 book is an account of an alternative way of thinking about evolution and the theory of games.
Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
Language: en
Pages: 356
Authors: Josef Hofbauer
Categories: Mathematics
Type: BOOK - Published: 1998-05-28 - Publisher: Cambridge University Press

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Every form of behaviour is shaped by trial and error. Such stepwise adaptation can occur through individual learning or through natural selection, the basis of
Evolutionary Dynamics and Extensive Form Games
Language: en
Pages: 346
Authors: Ross Cressman
Categories: Business & Economics
Type: BOOK - Published: 2003 - Publisher: MIT Press

DOWNLOAD EBOOK

Evolutionary game theory attempts to predict individual behavior (whether of humans or other species) when interactions between individuals are modeled as a non