Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union

Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union
Author :
Publisher : Cambridge University Press
Total Pages : 357
Release :
ISBN-10 : 9781107108882
ISBN-13 : 1107108888
Rating : 4/5 (82 Downloads)

Book Synopsis Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union by : Carlos Closa

Download or read book Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union written by Carlos Closa and published by Cambridge University Press. This book was released on 2016-10-13 with total page 357 pages. Available in PDF, EPUB and Kindle. Book excerpt: This book provides an analysis of key approaches to rule of law oversight in the EU and identifies deeper theoretical problems.


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